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Spillover Effects on Homicides across Mexican Municipalities: A Spatial 
Regime Model Approach 
  
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates spatial diffusion patterns of high levels of violence across 
Mexican municipalities to nearby locations while also exploring the possible effect of 
increasing law enforcement resources in some regions of the country. Our approach 
consists of providing a framework based on spatial regime models to address spatial 
heterogeneity that indicates instability in the structural determinants of homicides. In 
this context, a distinction is made in relation to the regimes that are analyzed between 
those municipalities that were exposed to joint operations (‘operativos conjuntos’) and 
those that were not exposed to the operations. Spatial econometric models were 
estimated for each regime in light of investigating possible spillover effects arising from 
the covariates. The results point to differences in regard to the significance, magnitude, 
and sign of the effects related to some variables according to each spatial regime’s 
specification. While the direct effects show that socioeconomic variables tend to play an 
important role in explaining the variation of homicides in the non-joint operation 
regime, the historical level of homicides and closeness to the U.S. border operate in a 
more significant way for those municipalities in the joint operation regime. In regard to 
the indirect effects estimates, a positive and significant spillover effect upon homicide 
rates is attributed to our law enforcement variable as well as to the proxy variable of 
informality. These spillover effects are found to be greater in magnitude especially in 
those municipalities exposed to joint operations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years Mexico has experienced increasing levels of violence, which 
have been attributed to the war among drug cartels, especially after the deployment of 
federal armed forces to combat the organizations belonging to drug cartels. Even though 
army interventions have taken place since the beginning of 2007 in different 
municipalities in order to bring down organized crime, homicides seem to have spread 
out to other municipalities, sparking a debate on whether other localities now suffer 
from the same problems due to the movement of criminal activities. The spatial 
displacement of criminal activity in Mexico makes an interesting case study since most 
studies have focused on developed countries.  
According to Clarke and Weisburd (1994), there is a diffusion effect of crime 
when an intervention to reduce crime has occurred in a place and in addition there are 
reduction benefits in places close to that area that were not targeted for intervention. In 
contrast, spatial displacement of crime refers to the relocation of such activity from one 
place to another as the result of an intervention. Even though displacement is seen as the 
opposite of diffusion, some still see benefits, for example Guerette and Bowers (1999) 
mention that the total volume of crime could be less than before the intervention and 
also that the type of crime displaced may be less serious. Barr and Pease (1990) mention 
negative effects of displacement, such as the concentration of crime, the focusing of 
crime on more vulnerable groups, or its relocation to areas where it has more impact.  
Moreover, some authors, such as Cohen and Tita (1999), use the term diffusion 
in the sense of displacement. These authors analyzed the spatial spread effect of 
homicides in neighboring areas in Pittsburgh; using dynamic Exploratory Spatial Data 
Analysis (ESDA), they distinguish between hierarchical diffusion (between common 
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influences) and contagious diffusion (between adjacent units). They find contagious 
effects whenever there are peaks of total homicides.   
Ratcliffe (2010) finds that usual methods are more relevant when used together 
with spatial tools such as the Global Moran’s I and the Local Indicator of Spatial 
Autocorrelation (LISA) and that, when applied to crime measures in neighborhoods of 
Philadelphia, stronger results are produced by using the combination of methods. In 
other cases, the use of exogenous events as natural experiments has been useful for the 
analysis of dispersion. For example, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) use the terrorist 
attack on a Jewish center in Buenos Aires as a focus to identify geographical units for 
police involvement, finding a lowering effect on crime, measured as car robbery, only 
in the same area of the attack, but no effect outside that small geographical unit. The 
authors acknowledge that such a method does not allow measurement of the magnitude 
of crime displacement to other areas. 
The effects of geographical movements of crime have been reviewed in other 
studies. The conclusions of Bannister (1991), Eck (1990), and Hessenling (1994), 
among others, can be summarized as similar: even though the phenomenon exists, it is 
not an unavoidable effect, and when it occurs it is limited in size and magnitude. They 
all agree that if there are other factors affecting crime, then displacement may be the 
result of a combination of factors, making it more difficult to discern the real 
displacement since other types of crime may also be on the rise.  
Understanding both concepts is crucial given the current context from which this 
study arises: a) the fight between different drug cartels to control geographical areas and 
b) the joint military operations (Operativos Conjuntos Militares) that started in 2007 
(technically at the end of 2006), when the federal government incremented the presence 
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of the army in those areas.1 The question of to what extent such interventions have 
contributed to the increase in homicides experienced, rather than to pacification, since 
these incidents occurred has attracted a great deal of attention, mostly in the media 
rather than in academia. Hence there is a need for a formal analysis to have a better 
understanding of the violence and what exactly is happening. As Escalante (2009) 
notes, there is no general explanation for territorial increases of violence, leaving a door 
open for research on the spatial analysis of the problem in Mexico 
In this sense, we aim to investigate spatial diffusion patterns of high levels of 
violence to nearby locations while also exploring the possible effect of increasing law 
enforcement resources in some regions of the country. Our approach consists of 
modeling the spatial process associated with the increase in homicides in Mexican 
municipalities by using exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) techniques along with 
spatial econometric methods. The main contribution consists of developing a framework 
based on spatial regime models to address spatial heterogeneity that could indicate the 
possibility of instability in the structural determinants of homicides. To date, and to the 
best of our knowledge, there is no other study that explicitly addresses the presence of 
spatial regimes using crime data in a cross-sectional setting for Mexico.  
The paper is structured as follows: section two outlines the context of increasing 
violence in Mexican regions and presents preliminary evidence for motivating the use 
of spatial regimes; section three introduces the spatial methods to be used in the 
analysis, along with the description of the database. The fourth section presents the 
results for the spatial analysis and the direct and indirect effects for diffusion. Finally, 
some conclusions are drawn. 
                                                
1 These operations were coordinated by military and federal police corporations and were backed by state and local 
security forces. The strategy included the dismantling of criminal organizations, the arrest of the largest possible number of 
criminals and confiscation of drug shipments, and, in particular, the deployment of military operations in several regions of the 
country and a permanent increase in resources devoted to military forces.  
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2. CONTEXT AND MOTIVATION FOR SPATIAL REGIMES 
The context in which the rising violence in Mexico has taken place can be 
framed with reference to past violence trends as well as to policies that the government 
has implemented during previous decades. Most of the discussion about crime and 
policies has taken place in the public arena and not in academia. Perhaps because of 
this, and as Escalante (2010) notes, there is little knowledge in Mexico about crime as a 
social problem, since social scientists have analyzed different topics. Escalante (2010) 
also argues that the territorial distribution of crime suggests a diverse profile of crime, 
making heterogeneity a rule, but no general pattern can explain such a rise in violence. 
A policy view to explain the rise in crime and the army interventions in the 
different states in Mexico can be found in the study of Chabat (2010). This author states 
that drug cartels were not a problem for the government up to the mid 1980s, when 
Mexico became an important route for trafficking drugs to the U.S.; in addition, Mexico 
had weak institutions, a lack of containment of corruption, and a really appalling 
tolerance policy toward the cartels. Chabat also suggests that there was a worsening of 
the security situation in the second half of the 1990s, possibly due to the economic crisis 
and the recruitment of some previous ex-armed forces by some cartels. 
In a complementary explanation, Escalante (2009) presents a trend for 
standardized homicides in Mexico over time, which shows a decreasing pattern in the 
decade of the 2000s, with a slight increase in 2006-2007, but a higher increase in some 
urban areas. He argues that in the 1990s there were unusual episodes of targeted crime 
(between some cartel’s heads); these episodes, however, made the population feel 
insecure, especially in the second half of the decade, and they were accompanied by an 
increase in violence in northern urban areas, which was previously based in rural areas. 
7	  
This made the phenomenon more visible; as a result of this, public opinion created 
pressure for interventions to decrease such episodes. 
Chabat (2010) also focuses on the institutional framework for fighting 
corruption and violence. Although some reforms were implemented, they did not 
translate into a reduction of corruption levels, and also the U.S. put pressure on the 
Mexican government to fight the cartels’ activities. In his analysis, as in that of others 
(Sanchez, 2011; Maldonado, 2012), the constant is the permeating of the structure of the 
institutions, such as the army and local police, by the cartels. In addition, these authors 
suggest that this was a factor determining the army intervention in some states in 2007 
and 2008, in addition to an urgency to legitimate a politically debilitated presidency 
after the 2006 elections. Other factors were also present: the cartels started to fight for 
specific areas to control; the formerly reluctant governments began to fight violence; 
there were conflicts with the U.S. Government due to drug policy related issues; and 
there was an increasing demand for drugs within Mexico (Chabat, 2010). 
As Escalante (2010) also notes, the spatial heterogeneity of the country needs to 
be explored when analyzing the rising violence, and this includes linking the homicide 
trends with social, economic, and demographic factors that are specific to geographical 
units. In this sense, while investigating the existence of spatial diffusion patterns and 
some structural variables associated with the increase in homicides in the Mexican 
municipalities, one must consider two complementary scenarios. On the one hand, there 
is the fight between different drug cartels to control geographical areas that led to joint 
military operations (Operativos Conjuntos Militares) between federal and state level 
governments. The two scenarios share one characteristic: the specific regions where 
violence occurred. The joint operations took place in seven states: Michoacán, 
Guerrero, Baja California, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Durango, 
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and in these states there has also been a bloody struggle among drug organizations to 
control the territory (see Figure 1).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
On the other hand, an additional peculiarity emerges: some of these states have 
previously been involved in either drug trafficking or illicit drug production, especially 
near the border with the U.S. (Sanchez, 2011). This issue certainly plays a role in 
explaining the rise in, and particularly the location of, the violence. As Zimring and 
Hawkins (1999) hypothesize, “the creation and expansion of illegal markets will 
produce extra homicides when social circumstances conducive to lethal violence exist.”  
In fact, when analyzing the spatial distribution of homicides in previous years, it 
can be noted that there is a clear concentration of high levels, particularly in most of the 
areas that are the center of attention today. In Figure 2 there are four maps showing the 
spatial distribution of homicides in Mexico in 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2010; the last two 
dates correspond to the period here analyzed. Some patterns emerge in these maps: a) 
levels of violence are not randomly distributed; instead, similar rates of violence tend to 
cluster together in space (i.e., violence exhibits positive spatial autocorrelation), b) the 
presence of positive spatial autocorrelation could indicate evidence of spatial 
diffusion/contagion across municipalities, particularly during the period 2006-2010 (as 
shown in Figure 3), and c) the diffusion pattern appears not to have occurred across the 
whole country but only within particular regions. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Figure 3 about here] 
These past and current patterns allow the exploration of different regimes in the 
spatial distribution of homicides. In light of the results it is plausible to hypothesize that 
some correlations might suffer from differing effects across these regimes as well. In 
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other words, the question raised in this paper focuses on whether the structural 
determinants of homicide rates are invariant across the geography of the study. The case 
in which structural conditions have differing effects on homicide levels in different 
geographical units leads to what is called spatial regimes (Messner and Anselin, 2004). 
This situation is formally addressed by considering the presence of spatial heterogeneity 
when modeling our variable of interest and which coefficients associated with the 
correlates vary systematically across geographic areas (Baller et al., 2001).   
In the next section we describe the methods used to examine the spatial 
distribution of homicides in Mexican municipalities in a spatial regime approach.  We 
start by exploring the spatial process of homicides through Exploratory Spatial Data 
Analysis (ESDA), more specifically the Local Indicator of Spatial Autocorrelation 
(LISA), in order to visualize and locate the extent to which high levels of homicides 
spread out to neighboring locations. Consequently, the data-generating process is 
specified and the appropriate modeling strategy described. Finally, a formal 
specification of the econometric model addressing the direct and indirect effects with 
spatial regimes is presented.  
 
3. METHODS AND DATA 
 
3.1 ESDA for Detecting Spatial Regimes in the Distribution of Homicides 
Spatial regimes are a form of spatial heterogeneity or, in other words, the 
variable of interest is not stable over space. When that variable is characterized by 
distinct distributions (e.g., with a different mean or variance) for different geographical 
units, these subregions might point to the existence of spatial regimes. 
We examined the possibility of spatial regimes in homicide rates based on the 
past and current spatial patterns previously described. The use of Exploratory Spatial 
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Data Analysis (ESDA) helps to visualize and describe the spatial distribution of 
homicides, which in turn assists us in the identification of spatial regimes and other 
kinds of spatial instability. This statistic assesses a null hypothesis of spatial 
randomness by comparing the values of local pairs, that is, the values of each specific 
location with the values in neighboring locations (Anselin, 1995). It is particularly 
useful as it allows the decomposition of spatial association into four categories: when a 
location with an above average value is surrounded by neighbors whose values are also 
above average (high-high, HH) or when a location with a below average value is 
surrounded by neighbors with below average values (low-low, LL). The decomposition 
of spatial association may also occur when a location with an above average value is 
surrounded by neighbors with below average values (high-low, HL), and vice versa 
(low-high, LH); see Anselin (1993) for a detailed description of the statistical properties 
of LISA statistics.  
 
3.2 Testing for Spatial Regimes 
Spatial heterogeneity arises when structural changes related to location exist in the 
data. In such cases, spatial regimes might be present; they are characterized by differing 
parameter values or functional forms (e.g., crime in certain regions might be structurally 
different from crime in other regions). Here, the assumption of a fixed relationship 
between dependent and independent variables that holds over the complete data set is 
formally investigated.  
A formal assessment for testing the structural stability of the regression coefficients 
across spatial subsets is possible through the spatial Chow test (Anselin, 1990).  A 
spatial switching regression, or spatial regimes model, applies spatial Chow tests to 
diagnose structural instability in parameters across regimes. A significant coefficient 
variable suggests a “level” shift in homicide rates across specific areas of study.  
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A standard regime model takes the form:  
 
 (1) 
 
 
where i,j index discrete spatial subsets or regimes of the data and a test of the null 
hypothesis consists of βi=βj, where the β are estimated in the above equation. This is the 
standard Chow test distributed as an F with (K, N-2K) degrees of freedom: 
 (2) 
 
 
where eR and eU are the OLS residuals from a restricted model and from an unrestricted 
model, respectively; N is the number of observations and K is the number of regressors. 
However, when the error terms are spatially autocorrelated, the above expression is no 
longer valid. A corrected version of the test is referred to as a spatial Chow test (see 
Anselin 1998, 1990):  
 (3) 
 
where λ represents the ML estimate for the spatial parameter and σ2 the estimate for the 
error variance for either the restricted model (LM test), the unrestricted model (W test), 
or both (LR test), and finally, I is an identity matrix of dimension nxn.  
 
3.3 Data-Generating Process 
 
In modeling homicide rates, the rate in any particular municipalities might be 
expected to depend upon the rates in neighboring municipalities; the result of a 
diffusion process of violence and the unseen boundaries between neighboring counties 
(Baller et al. 2001). To account for such a diffusion mechanism, spatial autoregressive 
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(SAR) models are proposed for the empirical analysis. These models have different 
specifications that in some cases incorporate as an additional covariate a spatially 
lagged dependent variable (Spatial Lag Model), a spatially autoregressive error term 
(Spatial Error Model), or both in the same regression model (SARAR Model). Other 
SAR model possibilities include lagging predictor variables instead of response 
variables. In this case, another term must also appear in the model for the autoregressive 
parameters of the spatially lagged predictors (WX); this is the so-called Spatial Durbin 
Model (SDM). These models are explored in the empirical analysis; however, because 
of restrictions of space, we briefly describe the generating process, with its associated 
direct and indirect effects for the Spatial Lag Model and SDM in the context of spatial 
regime models. For further information about cross-sectional setting, the reader is 
referred to LeSage and Pace (2009), or that of Elhorst (2014) in relation to panel data. 
The underlying generating process for the Spatial Lag Model is described as 
follows: 
 𝑦 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀 
 
(4) 𝑦 = 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !!𝑋𝛽 + 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !!𝜀 
 
(5) 𝜀 ∼ 𝑁 0,𝜎!𝐼!  
 
(6) 
where y denotes an nxn vector of the dependent variable (i.e., homicides); W is the 
spatial weights matrix, which is specified as a row-normalized binary contiguity matrix, 
with elements wij = 1 if two spatial neighborhoods share a common border but zero 
otherwise. In this model, the parameters to be estimated are the usual regression 
parameters 𝛽,𝜎 and the additional parameter 𝜌 corresponding to the lagged dependent 
variable, also known as the spatial autoregressive coefficient. The error term, 𝜀, is 
assumed to follow a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a variance of 𝜎!𝐼!, where 𝐼! denotes an nxn identity matrix.  
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 In the case of the SDM, the data-generating process can be formalized as 
follows: 
𝑦 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦 + 𝑋𝛽 +𝑊𝑋𝜃 + 𝜀 (7) 𝑦 = 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !!𝑋𝛽 + 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !!𝑊𝑋𝜃 + 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !!𝜀 (8) 𝜀 ∼ 𝑁 0,𝜎!𝐼!  (9) 
 
An implication of these models is that a change in the explanatory variable for a single 
geographical unit can potentially affect the dependent variable in all other units. In other 
words, a spatial lag specification of the dependent variable and/or a spatial lag of the 
covariates allows us to quantify spatial spillovers. Because our main interest is to 
specify a model accounting for spatial regimes, models (4) and (7) can be specified 
with, essentially, a dummy variable denoting the regime. This can be interpreted as 
follows in the case of the spatial lag model: 
𝑦 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦 + 𝑥!𝛽! + 𝑥!𝑥!𝛽! + 𝜀 (10) 
 
assuming for simplicity that 𝑥! is a continuous variable and 𝑥! is the spatial regime 
dummy variable (i.e., 0,1). The reduced form of this model is: 
𝑦 = 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !! 𝑥!𝛽! + 𝑥!𝑥!𝛽! + 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !!𝜀 (11) 
 
Note that the partial derivative of 𝑦 with respect to 𝑥! takes the following expression: 
 𝜕𝑦𝜕𝑥! = 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !! 𝛽! + 𝑥!𝛽!  (12) 
 
Now we have the following expression, depending on the value of 𝑥!: 
 𝜕𝑦𝜕𝑥! = 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !! 𝛽! + 𝛽!  when 𝑥!=1 (13) 𝜕𝑦𝜕𝑥! = 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !! 𝛽!  when 𝑥!=0 (14) 
The corresponding equation (11) in the case of the SDM is denoted as:   
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𝑦 = 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !! 𝑥!𝛽! + 𝑥!𝑥!𝛽!+ 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !!𝑊𝑥! 𝜃! + 𝑥!𝜃! + 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !!𝜀 (15) 
 
Consequently, the partial derivative of 𝑦 with respect to 𝑥! can be expressed as follows: 𝜕𝑦𝜕𝑥! = 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !! 𝛽! + 𝑥!𝛽! + 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !!(𝑊𝜃! + 𝑥!𝑊𝜃!) (16) 
 
Hence, expressions (13) and (14) are now of the form: 
 𝜕𝑦𝜕𝑥! = 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !!(𝛽! + 𝛽! +𝑊𝜃! +𝑊𝜃!) when 𝑥!=1 (17) 𝜕𝑦𝜕𝑥! = 𝐼! − 𝜌𝑊 !! 𝛽! +𝑊𝜃!  when 𝑥!=0 (18) 
 
The results obtained in (14)-(15) and (17)-(18) convey important implications for the 
proper interpretation of spatial model estimates. Specifically, they allow us to estimate 
and separate direct and indirect effects from each covariate in the model. In other 
words, it is possible to differentiate the direct (within a municipality) impact of an 
independent variable on the dependent variable from the indirect (to/from neighboring 
municipalities) impact. The latter is particularly relevant in relation to spillover effects. 
For example, a change in X at any location will be transmitted to all other locations 
following the matrix inverse W, even if two locations according to W are unconnected 
(Vega and Elhorst 2013). Another characteristic is that it also includes feedback effects 
that arise as a result of impacts passing through neighboring units (e.g., from 
observation i to j to k) and back to the unit the change originated from (observation i) 
(LeSage and Pace 2009, p. 35).  
Formally, for each model specification a nxn matrix arises from the partial 
derivatives describe above where the direct effects are calculated from the average of 
the main diagonal elements  (own-partial derivatives), while the cumulative sum off-
diagonal elements for each row reflects indirect effects (cross-partial derivatives).  
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In addition, there is a need to produce estimates of the dispersion, which can be used to 
calculate the standard deviation of each coefficient. These in turn can be used to 
construct the usual t-statistics for inference regarding the statistical significance of each 
coefficient’s direct and indirect effect. These would show which variables produce 
(statistically significant) spatial spillover impacts. For such purposes, the appropriate 
routines in R-software are used. 
 
 
3.4 Data and Covariates  
The data for homicides come from the vital statistics of the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI). These data consider all types of homicides (ICD-10: 
X85-Y09)2 that occurred in Mexican municipalities during the years 2005-2010. We 
also explore a database for homicides related to drug rivalry or organized crime released 
by the Presidencia de la Republica. Starting in 2007, a database on homicides related to 
organized crime was produced for statistical purposes only; no ministerial or judicial 
information was included, only the numbers of deaths in municipalities and states. 
These deaths are classified as homicides related to organized crime if they occur with 
extreme violence or as an event involving more than two victims and include at least 
two of the following criteria: an injury resulting from the use of a firearm; torture and 
severe injuries; a body is found in the interior of a vehicle; materials characteristic of 
the modus operandi of organized crime are used; and particular facts were related to the 
death, such as if the event occurred in an ambush or was a persecution or if a message 
linked to organized crime was found.  
However, these data exhibit some issues relating to data-gathering reliability 
given the criteria used when classifying homicides and because for some of the cases no 
official death certificate is attached. These factors in turn produce an overestimate of the 
                                                
2 International Classification of Diseases, World Health Organization.  
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total counts of homicides related to organized crime or drug rivalry compared to those 
officially reported by INEGI (Merino and Gomez 2012).  Even though we analyzed 
both databases currently available in Mexico, the final set of results is based on 
mortality data from the official vital statistics report by INEGI.3 
All data come from officially collected databases, and the summary of the 
variables is presented in Table A1 of the Appendix. We include as a covariate a set of 
factors that, usually, the literature relates to crime. One of them is the previous level of 
homicide rates in each municipality, measured as the average during a five-year period 
before the deployment of armed forces to particular states in Mexico, in order to include 
the trend in crime at the local level. 
The rate of youth unemployment is one variable that may be a determinant in the 
increase in homicides if we consider that a lack of opportunities may make crime 
attractive. Even though there is no consensus on such an effect, we include this variable 
as a proxy for opportunities available to the young. The other covariate that is included 
is the average number of years of schooling in the municipality. Education is considered 
to be a factor related to crime since more educated individuals are supposed to ponder 
the actions associated with crime, and then expecting a reduction of the phenomenon.  
Inequality may have an incidence on social dissolution and may lower the 
rewards for individuals on a low income of being involved in legal activities. Here we 
have used the Gini Index at the municipal level as calculated by the Consejo Nacional 
de Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL) for 2005.  
Heterogeneity of the population and social fragmentation may also affect the 
rates of homicides and violence. Here we consider the percentage of births without 
social security registration as a proxy for informality. In Mexico, a worker employed in 
                                                
3  Also, Rodriguez-Oreggia and Flores (2012) detect that between 8-12 percent of municipalities have at some points in time more 
homicides related to narcotics than the total official account of homicides, which is clearly a mistake in the database. 
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the formal sector of the economy has social security benefits by law, allowing him or 
her immediate family the use of the public health system. Those in the informal sector 
are usually not covered in terms of insurance and other benefits. The divorce rate is a 
measure of family disruption and is commonly positively associated with homicides. 
This variable is included and standardized per 1,000 inhabitants. 
We also include the percentage of the population working in agriculture. This 
variable proxy is included, on the one hand, to reflect the economic opportunities in the 
area, since earnings associated with agriculture are usually lower, and, on the other 
hand, to show how attractive the local market is for drug-related activities. The higher 
the agricultural activity, the lower the acquisitional power of individuals to market 
drugs.  
Some controls for institutional characteristics of the localities are also 
considered. We considered data from administrative records reported by INEGI in 2005 
at the state level, which illustrates the ratio of sentences issued relative to preliminary 
investigations. This is a proxy for the administration of justice in each state. 
One of the most common criticisms of problem-oriented policing efforts is that 
crime will simply relocate to other times and places since the “root causes” of crime 
were not addressed or because offenders may remain on the streets after certain crime 
opportunities are reduced. This phenomenon has important implications for many 
problem-oriented policing projects (Gurette 2009).  While targeting a particular area 
with extra police resources might reduce crime in that particular location, criminal 
activity might just move to places not protected by police intervention. Addressing this 
effect in our investigation is important given the fact that increases in law enforcement 
in specific regions are attributed to the joint operations discussed above. We must note 
that data for a number of police forces at municipal level were not available when this 
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study was being done.  Nonetheless, we use as a proxy variable the number of arrests 
that are drug-related and that are prosecuted by federal law enforcement authorities. It is 
assumed that there is a positive relationship between the number of arrests and 
increasing law enforcement efforts in a given municipality.  
The distance from each municipality to the closest state capital, whether or not 
the municipality belongs to the state, is included in the model with the aim of capturing 
the effect of population density. We prefer to use this variable instead because of the 
high correlation of population density with other covariates; thus, issues of 
multicollinearity are ameliorated. Furthermore, most of the socioeconomic variables 
included in the analysis also tend to be directly related to this variable. Hence, the closer 
each municipality is to a capital the more it is expected to be positively and directly 
associated with homicides. We also calculated the distance from each municipality to 
the U.S. border. Previous studies have found that “municipios” located close to the U.S. 
border experience differential increases in homicides, gun-related homicides, and crime 
gun seizures, particularly after 2004 (Dube et al. 2013). Finally, to account for local 
drug-related activities, we introduce a dummy if a particular municipality has been 
identified as a port for entry of drugs into the country, as reported by Roda and Burton 
(2010). 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 ESDA Results 
Table 1 reports the prevalence of municipalities within each local cluster type 
obtained from the Local Indicator of Spatial Autocorrelation (LISA) on a yearly basis 
over the period 2005 to 2010. Three main results arise and are described as follows. 
First, the number of municipalities exhibiting significance levels for any local-neighbor 
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pairs (cluster type) of total homicide rates rose during the period of study from 418 to 
548. Second, at the beginning of the period there were approximately 109 municipalities 
showing a HH cluster type of total homicides, accounting for 4.4 percent of the 
municipalities. These are municipalities with homicide rate values of above average that 
are surrounded by neighbors whose values are also above average. Note that the HH 
cluster type reached its highest levels in 2008, with 7 percent of total municipalities or 
approximately 174 municipalities being included in this type. This HH cluster type 
shows a consistent decline after reaching its peak in 2009 and 2010, although its values 
are still higher than the initial values in 2005.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The geographic diffusion patterns followed by the HH clusters are also 
noteworthy.  In Figure 4 it is possible to distinguish the states that are subject to joint 
operations as well as the distribution of the HH cluster from 2005 to 2010. The latter are 
displayed as centroids circles with a graduated color corresponding to each year. As 
observed, much of the concentration of high homicide rates at the beginning of the 
period occurs in the states that will have joint operations later. This in turn supports the 
argument that the federal government used to deploy armed forces in particular areas 
within the country that exhibited considerably high levels of violence. Note also that the 
diffusion of HH clusters does not seem to spread out across the whole country but is 
centered particularly within those states facing the joint operations. 
 [Figure 4 about here] 
 
4.2 Spatial Regime Results 
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In examining the possibility of spatial regimes in homicide rates, the selection of 
the regimes is supported on visual inspection as well as the ESDA analysis above 
described. It has been shown that the states that are subject to joint operations have 
longstanding drug-related activities and a greater proportion of their municipalities 
characterized by showing higher levels of homicides even before facing the joint 
operations. In this context, the analysis consists of distinguishing the regimes from 
those municipalities facing joint operations versus those that were not exposed to the 
operations.  
The spatial Chow test indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis of coefficients’ 
stability, according to the results shown in Table 2. These results are robust to different 
model specifications discussed previously, although it is only reported the spatial Chow 
test corresponds to a spatial lag model. Note that the test is estimated via spatial two-
stage least squares (S2SLS) given the inclusion of the spatial lag of the dependent 
variable at the right-hand side of the model; this estimation method allows the 
construction of a proper instrument for the spatial lag (Anselin 1988; Kelejian and 
Robinson 1993; Kelejian and Prucha 1998). The results suggest that the assumption of a 
stable pattern across regions does not hold, and the test of individual coefficients reveals 
that several of the correlates exhibit significantly different effects in the municipalities 
with joint operation in comparison with those with no joint operation. The evidence 
indicates significantly different coefficients in each of the regimes, even after 
accounting for spatial dependence attributed to the spatial lag of the dependent variable.   
[Table 2 about here] 
 Once the existence of spatial regimes in the spatial variation of homicides has 
been defined and formally tested, the next step is estimating spatial econometric models 
in light of investigating possible spillover effects arising from the independent 
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variables. In Table 3 we show the estimated coefficients corresponding to the spatial lag 
model and the Spatial Durbin Model. Two findings are noted. First, the AIC comparison 
between both models and for each spatial regime suggests that the Spatial Durbin Model 
model fits the data better than the spatial lag model. Second, the spatial lag coefficient 
(ρ) demonstrates that the endogenous interaction relationship accounts for the homicide 
variation across Mexican municipalities and that the estimates of the spatial lag effect, 
comparing each regime, are somewhat similar in the spatial lag and spatial Durbin 
models, even controlling for other explanatory covariates.  
[Table 3 about here] 
 
4.3 Estimated Direct and Indirect Effects Results 
The final set of results, which describes direct and indirect effects, is based on 
the SDM and presented in the rest of this section. The selection of the SDM is also 
consistent given the circumstances that LeSage and Pace (2009) point out and that 
might be present in our estimates: (1) there is one (or there are more) potentially 
important variable(s) omitted from the model, (2) this variable is likely to be correlated 
with the explanatory variables included in the model; and (3) the disturbance process is 
likely to be spatially dependent.  
Another characteristic in favor of the SDM over the Spatial Lag Model is that 
both the direct effect and the spillover effect of an explanatory variable depend not only 
on the parameter 𝜌 and 𝑊 but also on the coefficient estimate 𝜃!. In other words, the 
SDM do not posit prior restrictions on the magnitude of both the direct and the indirect 
effects, and thus the ratio between the indirect and the direct effects may be different for 
different explanatory variables (Elhorst 2010, p. 22).  
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The results arising from the estimation of direct and indirect effects are shown in 
Table 4. We will first compare across regimes the direct effects estimates exhibiting 
significant levels. In the case of the non-joint operation regime, some of the 
socioeconomic variables considered here tend to play an important role in explaining 
the variation in homicides. For example, higher levels of income inequality in a given 
municipality positively affect homicides rates in such a location.  Administration of 
justice shows a significant and negative expected effect (-0.004) on homicide rates in 
the non-joint operation regime, although the magnitude of the effect appears to be 
limited. For the same type of spatial regime, family disruption tends to have a positive 
direct effect on homicide rates (0.040) as do informality levels, which tend to positively 
influence homicide rates (0.099). Note that past levels of violence, or historical 
homicides rates, are found to be significant in both regimes, although the magnitude is 
greater in the joint operation regime (0.001 and 0.014 respectively). Conversely, the 
direct effects associated with the law enforcement variable are found to negatively 
affect homicide rates in a given municipality, and its magnitude is approximately the 
same in both regimes (-0.109 and 0.094 respectively).  
[Table 4 about here] 
Interesting results arise from the estimation of indirect effects that, as discussed 
above, are associated with spillover effects. First, agricultural employment, historical 
levels of homicides, and distance to the U.S. border exhibit significant indirect effects 
(spatial spillovers) in both regimes, but the estimates are approximately three times 
higher in magnitude in the joint operations regime (-0.230, 0.016, and  -0.514 
respectively).  
Conversely, the indirect effects of income inequality, administration of justice, 
and port of entry or exit for drug trafficking are statistically significantly different at 99 
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percent level only in the non-joint operation regime, while exhibiting the expected 
effect (0.398, -0.219, and 1.062 respectively). These results suggest evidence of a 
cumulative impact of higher levels of income inequality associated with increases in 
homicides rates across neighboring geographic units in the sample. More interesting is 
the fact that administration of justice negatively affects homicides rates while 
generating a negative spillover effect, and where its magnitude seems to overcome the 
estimated direct effect. The final, but no less important, result is that being proximate to 
a port of entry or exit for drug trafficking is associated with a spillover effect of higher 
levels of homicide rates across the region. While the magnitude of the effect is 
particularly high among all other estimated coefficients with significance levels, this 
result holds for the non-joint operation regime exclusively. The proxy variable for 
informality, births without social security, also shows significance at the 99 percent 
level solely for the joint operation regime and its positive coefficient (0.608), suggesting 
that increases in informality conditions would be associated with a spillover effect 
across the region that would in turn positively affect homicide rates.  
A significant result that arises concerns positive spillover effects from the law 
enforcement variable that is roughly equal in magnitude in both regimes. This suggests 
that increasing law enforcement in a particular region would experience a feedback 
effect across regions (municipalities) that would eventually positively impact homicides 
at the original location. In other words, the results suggest that boosting a particular area 
with law enforcement personnel would bring down the number of homicides in that 
particular area as the direct effects show negative and significant coefficient in either of 
the regimes (0.333 and 0.349); however, the positive spillover across the rest of the 
regions appears to be significantly higher in magnitude, leading to a positive cumulative 
effect on homicides. This effect seems to be consistent with the argument that crime 
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displacement occurred particularly after the deployment of armed forces in specific 
areas of Mexico.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have aimed to analyze the extent of the diffusion of crime, 
measured with homicides, between the Mexican municipalities from 2005 to 2010. 
During this period, Mexico was characterized by a rise in organized crime, and while 
some army intervention was executed in some states, crime seems also to have 
increased in other nearby localities. Here we look at this particular phenomenon by 
using ESDA techniques and exploring the existence of spatial regimes in the variation 
of homicide rates across municipalities. In doing so, we try to link some other local 
factors with a set of covariates. For a developing country immersed in an organized 
crime wave, the analysis and implications are relevant, not only for Mexico but for 
similar countries in the region. 
The LISA analysis suggests an increase in clusters of homicides for the period of 
consideration in 2 percentage points of the municipalities. Spatial clustering of high 
levels of homicides is found to occur in the first years under analysis, particularly in 
states where army intervention took place later. Even after the army intervention, most 
of them remained high-high clusters of violence. The evidence also points to a diffusion 
of high levels of homicide rates to nearby municipalities.  
Given past and recent spatial variation trends of homicide rates across 
municipalities, we allow for the possibility of spatial regimes. In formally evaluating 
this, we found two spatial regimes corresponding approximately to the states that were 
exposed to the joint operation versus those that were not. Consequently, we estimated 
spatial econometric models that corresponded to each regime aimed to account for 
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spatial dependence among the observations. A Spatial Durbin Model appeared to be the 
appropriate specification when estimating the effect of socioeconomic, law 
enforcement, and drug-related activities variables upon homicide rates. Most important 
is the possibility of capturing spillover effects associated with these variables, given the 
estimation of direct and indirect effects. 
The spatial regression results point to differences in regard to the significance, 
magnitude, and sign of the effects related with some variables according to each spatial 
regime’s specification. While the direct effects show that socioeconomic variables tend 
to play an important role in explaining the variation of homicides in the non-joint 
operation regime, a historical level of homicides and closeness to the U.S. border 
operate in a greater way for those municipalities in the joint operation regime. In regard 
to the indirect effects estimates, a positive and significant spillover effect upon 
homicide rates is attributed to our law enforcement variable as well as to the proxy of 
informality. These spillover effects are found to be greater in magnitude especially in 
those municipalities exposed to joint operations. 
 The implications of this analysis are important. Provided that the only 
significant intervention to fight organized crime was army intervention in some areas, 
the results suggest that such actions were mostly ineffective in spatially restraining 
levels of violence, at least during the period considered here, leading to the spread of 
organized crime to neighboring areas. This calls for the implementation of other actions, 
either to replace this or to be complementary to it, in places where homicides have 
increased and spread among areas.  
 Two final comments should be given careful attention. First, we recognize that 
this is a very sensitive topic that could be approached from different fields such as civil 
rights, criminology, the economics of crime, and sociology, among others. No further 
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considerations are implied about whether the federal government acted somehow 
unilaterally when it developed the “operativos conjuntos” strategy. We recognize that 
ensuring civilians’ right to safety should be fully met by a government under any 
circumstances.  
The second has to do with the theoretical framework and statistical techniques 
described here. As explained above, these explicitly consider the spatial dependence of 
homicides where the goal was to show the existence of a spatial diffusion of high levels 
along with geographic displacement to areas immediately surrounding the direct focus 
of the policy efforts described. Nonetheless, the inference made from the empirical 
analysis does not imply a formal causality test between army intervention and rising 
homicides in absolute terms; other factors such as clashes between drug cartels or 
groups within them could be influential factors.  
Further analysis is required to provide more insights into the cause and effects of 
particular events relating to rising violence levels in Mexico. In this sense, recently 
proposed spatio-temporal interaction models that could be applied to crimes events offer 
great promise for proactive and predictive policing and have the potential to facilitate 
interventions in existing crime hot spots as well as anticipatory interventions in the 
forecasted locations of future crime hot spots (Rey, Mack, and Koschinsky 2012). 
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Figure 2. Spatial Distribution of Homicide Rates 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 
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Figure 4. Spatial Diffusion of High-High LISA Clusters of Homicides Rates, 2005-2010 
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Table 1. Percentage of municipalities with significant LISA values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cluster(Type 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
HH((High9High) 4.44 4.97 3.42 7.09 6.32 5.58
(109) (122) (84) (174) (155) (137)
LL((Low9Low) 8.64 10.47 9.21 10.92 10.47 14.87
(212) (257) (226) (268) (257) (365)
LH((Low9High) 2.57 2.04 2.53 2.24 1.96 1.43
(63) (50) (62) (55) (48) (35)
HL((High9Low) 1.39 1.18 1.51 1.26 0.86 0.45
(34) (29) (37) (31) (21) (11)
No(Significant 82.97 81.34 83.3 78.48 80.4 77.67
(2036) (1996) (2045) (1926) (1973) (1906)
N 2454 2454 2454 2454 2454 2454
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Table 2. Spatial Chow Test Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No Joint Operation Joint Operation
Structural differences in 
correlates
Gini Index, 2000 0.245*** -0.231 1.278
(0.0789) (0.4144)
Schooling Years, 2000 -0.018 -0.079 0.196
(0.0306) (0.1335)
% Agricultural Employment, 2000 0.004 0.036 0.529
(0.0136) (0.0482)
Administration of Justice, 2005 -0.007 -0.111 0.583
(0.0255) (0.1330)
Youth Unemployment, 2000 0.001 -0.059 1.2
(0.0138) (0.0535)
% Births without SS, 2005 0.039 0.034 0.001
(0.0270) (0.1333)
% Interstate Migrants, 2005 -0.005 0.011 0.085
(0.0088) (0.0400)
% Divorced 0.007 0.168** 3.048
(0.0175) (0.0904)
Av. Homicides, 2000-2004 0.001*** 0.011*** 16.828***
(0.0003) (0.0024)
Port 0.359** -0.166 3.124*
(0.1722) (0.2426)
Arrests Narcotics Per Capita -0.107*** 0.153** 6.826***
(0.0412) (0.0709)
Distance to U.S. Border -0.074** 0.016 1.104
(0.0347) (0.0800)
Distance nearest Capital 0.009 -0.081 0.666
(0.0274) (0.0960)
Intercept 0.453*** -0.528 1.214
(0.1748) (0.8737)
Spatial Lag Parameter (ρ) 0.717*** 0.646*** 8.439***
(0.1138) (0.1151)
Global test 39.177***
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Spatial Lag Model (S2SLS)
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Table 3. Estimated Coefficients from Spatial Regression Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No#Joint#Operation Joint#Operation No#Joint#Operation Joint#OperationGini#Index,#2000 0.340 *** 80.380 0.281 *** 80.621 *(0.0822) (0.2545) (0.1057) (0.3051)Schooling#Years,#2000 80.006 80.070 80.023 80.111(0.0328) (0.0818) (0.0356) (0.0850)%#Agricultural#Employment,#2000 80.008 0.076 ** 0.013 0.112 ***(0.0152) (0.0316) (0.0210) (0.0387)Administration#of#Justice,#2005 80.086 *** 0.006 0.008 80.181(0.0219) (0.0797) (0.0490) (0.1334)Youth#Unemployment,#2000 80.008 80.037 80.009 80.041(0.0159) (0.0366) (0.0167) (0.0365)%#Births#without#SS,#2005 0.037 80.019 0.102 *** 80.228 **(0.0263) (0.0605) (0.0337) (0.0940)%#Interstate#Migrants,#2005 80.019 ** 80.042 80.015 80.003(0.0095) (0.0255) (0.0121) (0.0295)%#Divorced 0.047 *** 0.108 ** 0.038 * 0.023(0.0174) (0.0427) (0.0191) (0.0479)Av.#Homicides,#200082004 0.002 *** 0.015 *** 0.002 *** 0.013 ***(0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0017)Arrests#Narcotics#Per#Capita 0.065 ** 0.120 *** 80.134 *** 80.116 ***(0.0290) (0.0261) (0.04260) (0.0393)Port# 0.154 0.181 0.098 0.076(0.1233) (0.1239) (0.12415) (0.1245)Distance#to#U.S.#Border 80.039 80.085 ** 0.029 0.269(0.0313) (0.0407) (0.0596) (0.0875)Distance#nearest#Capital 0.112 *** 0.061 *** 80.004 80.030(0.0249) (0.0224) (0.04103) (0.0385)Intercept 0.124 80.348 *** 0.155 80.536 ***(0.0933) (0.0551) (0.1221) (0.0630)
W"Av.#Homicides,#200082004 0.000 0.007 **(0.0005) (0.0029)
W"Gini#Index,#2000 0.101 0.721(0.1587) (0.5151)
W#Schooling#Years,#2000 0.014 0.059(0.0617) (0.1815)
W"%#Agricultural#Employment,#2000 80.049 80.196 ***(0.0298) (0.0666)
W#Administration#of#Justice,#2005 80.130 ** 0.279(0.0565) (0.1683)
W"Youth#Unemployment,#2000 80.027 80.292 ***(0.0317) (0.0813)
W"%#Births#without#SS,#2005 80.073 0.494 ***(0.0517) (0.1312)
W"%#Interstate#Migrants,#2005 80.008 80.155 ***(0.0176) (0.0508)
W"%#Divorced 0.002 0.229 ***(0.0332) (0.0899)
W"Port# 0.566 0.278(0.2347) (0.2427)
W#Arrests#Narcotics#Per#Capita 0.315 *** 0.337 ***(0.0522) (0.0476)
W#Distance#to#U.S.#Border 80.101 80.444 ***(0.0743) (0.1129)
W#Distance#nearest#Capital 0.157 *** 0.107 **(0.0502) (0.0457)pho 0.413** 0.491** 0.349*** 0.456***(0.0243) (0.0229) #(0.0263) (0.0238)N 2039 417 2039 417Wald 458.76 289.16 365.46 175.72LR#test 387.13 256.52 315.57 161.41AIC 3402.4 3266.2 3357.7 3169.1Log#likelihood 81685.177 81617.109 81649.834 81555.527
W"denotes-the-spatial-lag-of-the-respective-variable.-*-p<0.10,-**p<0.05,-***p<0.01
Spatial#Lag#Model Spatial#Durbin#Model
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Table 4. Estimated Direct, Indirect and Total Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect TotalGini$Index,$2000 0.303*** 0.398*** 0.701*** 60.586* 0.739 0.153*
(2.987) (1.698) (2.993) (61.986) (1.017) (0.181)Schooling$Years,$2000 60.022 0.006 60.016 60.109 0.029 60.079
(60.671) (0.052) (60.168) (61.305) (0.091) (60.311)%$Agricultural$Employment,$2000 0.008 60.075* 60.066 0.100*** 60.230*** 60.129
(0.421) (61.723) (61.567) (1.767) (61.604) (61.518)Administration$of$Justice,$2005 60.004** 60.219*** 60.223*** 60.165 0.316 0.150
(60.076) (63.329) (64.608) (61.267) (1.623) (1.014)Youth$Unemployment,$2000 60.011 60.053 60.064 60.062 60.449 60.511
(60.659) (61.012) (61.140) (61.680) (63.903) (64.094)%$Births$without$SS,$2005 0.099*** 60.046 0.052 60.199** 0.608*** 0.409***
(3.041) (60.568) (0.667) (62.227) (3.857) (3.009)%$Interstate$Migrants,$2005 60.016 60.026 60.042 60.014 60.229 60.243
(61.391) (61.014) (61.624) (60.516) (63.394) (63.518)%$Divorced 0.040** 0.034 0.074 0.039 0.347 0.387
(2.156) (0.639) (1.298) (0.786) (2.755) (2.856)Distance$nearest$Capital 0.010 0.270*** 0.281*** 60.023 0.141 0.118
(0.247) (4.237) (4.916) (60.653) (2.722) (2.865)Av.$Homicides,$2000J2004 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.030***
(4.120) (2.201) (3.319) (8.478) (4.612) (9.268)Arrests$Narcotics$Per$Capita 60.109*** 0.442*** 0.333*** 60.094*** 0.435*** 0.340***
(62.623) (6.555) (5.191) (62.498) (7.697) (6.976)Port$ 0.1581 1.062** 1.220** 0.097 0.447 0.545
(1.163) (2.500) (2.470) (0.745) (1.242) (1.284)Distance$to$U.S.$Border 0.020 60.152* 60.132* 0.244*** 60.514** 60.269**
(0.349) (61.648) (61.874) (2.874) (63.969) (63.009)
*=p<0.10,=**p<0.05,=***p<0.01
Spatial=Durbin=Model
No=Joint=Operation Joint=Operation
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Summary Statistics of the Variables included in the Analysis 
 
 
Variable Year Source Mean SD
Total Homicide Rates 2005-2010 Estadisticas Vitales, Datos de Mortalidad, INEGI. 12.5 18.6
Youth Unemployment 2000 Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda 2000, INEGI. 0.2 0.7
Schooling Years 2000 Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda 2000, INEGI. 1.6 0.3
Gini Index 2005 Consejo Nacional de Evaluacion de la Politica Nacional, CONEVAL. -0.9 0.1
% Births without SS 2005
Secretaría de Salud/Dirección General de Información en Salud, 
Estimaciones con base en las Proyecciones de la Población de México 
2005 - 2030.
4.2 0.4
% Agricultural Employment 2000 Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda 2000, INEGI. 3.5 1.0
% Interstate Migrants 2005 Conteo de Poblacion y Vivienda 2005, INEGI. 2.2 1.2
% Administration Justice, 2005 2005 Registros administrativos, Estadisticas judiciales en materia penal, INEGI. 3.0 0.5
% Divorced 2005 Registros administrativos, Estadisticas vitales, INEGI. 12.8 6.6
Arrests Narcotics per capita 2005 Registros administrativos, Estadisticas judiciales en materia penal, INEGI. 66.8 449.0
Port (entry/exit) drug trafficking 2010 Rhoda and Burton (2010)
Distance to the U.S. border Own elaboration. 739.9 269.4
Distance to the nearest capital Own elaboration. 105.4 75.7
